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ABSTRACT 
A Twisted Frame: Gu Xiong's Barricade of Bicycles (1991), Dissident Pop, and the 
National Gallery of Canada 
Charles Patrick Thomas Leonard 
 The acquisition of artwork by national institutions may heighten the relationship between 
a nation's publics and its domestic culture. However, such acquisitions are not devoid of 
an interpretive process in which dominant discourses guide institutionalization. This 
thesis examines the National Gallery of Canada's 1996 accession of Chinese-born 
Canadian artist Gu Xiong's Barricade of Bicycles, June 4, 1989 (1990) as situated within 
a complex set of values that were conferred to the work by the institution through the 
processes of selection, accession and exhibition. Originally presented as part of an 
installation, the ink and acrylic on paper contour drawing was the first work by a Chinese 
contemporary artist purchased for the National Gallery's permanent collection. The 
figurative style of the drawing typifies currents of 1980s Chinese modernism and 
Political Pop. This thesis argues that the acquisition of Barricade of Bicycles, June 4, 
1989 privileged the object's political content because of the global awareness of China's 
complex socio-political and cultural conditions following the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre. The thesis begins with a description and exhibition history of Barricade of 
Bicycles in relation to its contexts of production and the artist’s migration story. It then 
considers the reception of contemporary Chinese art in Western contexts. Focusing on 
Political Pop and the theme of destruction in relation to Xiamen Dada, it proposes the 
term “Dissident Pop” to refer to these discussions. The thesis concludes with a 
consideration of the Gallery’s purchase in relation to these contexts as well as the politics 
of representation and Canada’s foreign policy at the time of the work’s acquisition. 
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This thesis investigates the circumstances and reasons for the purchase in 1996 of the ink 
and acrylic on wove paper drawing by Chinese artist Gu Xiong (b.1953) titled  Barricade 
of Bicycles, June 4, 1989 (1990; 251 x 600 cm) by the National Gallery of Canada. 1 
Originally presented as part of an installation, the monumental contour drawing was the 
first work by a Chinese contemporary artist accessioned into the Gallery’s permanent 
collection. I argue this particular acquisition was a curatorial decision situated in the 
context of changing economic ties between Canada and China and made in view of the 
artwork's politically dissident subject matter as well as the rising global market interest in 
Chinese contemporary art.2 In the process, I examine the forces that gave this work its 
conceptual shape and its value as cultural capital, including the emigration of Chinese 
artists in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, many of whose practices were 
steeped in the modernist idiom popular in China in the 1980s. The tragic events at 
Tiananmen Square which peaked in June of 1989, memorialized in the twisted mass of 
bicycle parts depicted in Gu's Barricade, weighed heavily upon international responses to 
the communist Chinese state as well as the production and reception of works by 
contemporary artists in China during the 1990s. 
 The creation and acquisition of Barricade amidst dialogical currents of identity 
politics within Canada and the emergence of a global civil society founded on economic 
1 Throughout this text, I have followed standards of attribution for Chinese names, in which the surname 
occurs first when read left to right. The artwork at the centre of this study is variously referred to as 
Barricade of Bicycle, June 4, 1989 (the full title assigned to it following acquisition) and Barricade of 
Bicycles, two titling variations that significantly inflect the margin of interpretation. Where possible, I have 
tried to distinguish between the full installation and the drawing purchased by the National Gallery of 
Canada. The title for both is frequently simplified to “Barricade”. 
2 National Gallery of Canada Archives, “Gu Xiong: Barricade of Bicycles,” National Gallery of Canada 
Acquisition Proposal, 1996.  
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growth and human rights, inaugural interest in Chinese contemporary art by the Gallery 
and revealed a desire to disentangle a stratum of overlapping classifications. The 
permeations of diasporic Chinese artists into foreign contexts destabilizes fixed 
essentialist notions of “Chinese” or “Canadian” identity. In Gu’s case in the Canadian 
context, classifying Barricade as a work by a Canadian artist and incorporating it into the 
art collection of Canada’s national museum conceptually raised the issue of these 
unstable categories; so too does the manner in which the this artwork is framed to 
underscore a political message.  
The decline of communist systems at the end of the Cold War seemed assured by 
events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Tiananmen Square massacre. However, 
China's adoption of a “one nation, two systems” approach to accelerate growth and 
modernization of the Chinese economy also positioned China as a formidable ideological 
and economic competitor. In this context, scores of Chinese artists living, exhibiting and 
producing work abroad in North Atlantic nations achieved unprecedented significance, 
particularly those whose output were lauded as “dissident art” in their underscoring of  
victimhood, identity or politics. The reception of post-Cultural Revolution , post-
Tiananmen Chinese art in Europe and North America during the 1990s spoke to the re-
conceptualization of international relations with China and attempts to envision a global 
civil society on Euro-American ideological terms motivated by an emergent paranoia 
regarding Chinese economic ascendency.  
Three key overlapping contexts are therefore significant to address in this thesis in 
order to provide a comprehensive critical analysis Gu’s Barricade of Bicycles and the 
reasons for its purchase in the Canadian context. The first is the artistic development of 
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Chinese art and its correlative political and social history in the twentieth century from 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) to the pro-democratization movements in art and 
society until the end of the 1980s. This includes, among other significant events, the end 
of the Cultural Revolution, the liberalization of cultural policy, and the development of 
the Chinese avant-garde idiom that informs the visual language of Gu’s work in general. 
This would also be to take into account the popularization, in the immediate post-
Tiananmen years, of Chinese art outside China which initiated a thriving international 
market in Chinese cultural objects both contemporary and historical.3 
The second context is constituted by Gu's biography, particularly his artistic 
development and his relocation to Canada after the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 to 
produce Barricade. The work, possessing a clear emotional resonance and political 
gravity, would seem a natural artistic response from a recent immigrant from China to 
Canada, given the short time following the events it depicts. It is a strikingly overt 
reference to Tiananmen, and hence to China’s authoritarian repression and state-
orchestrated violence against civilians at a time when their open acknowledgement 
invited censure and continues to do so. Another remarkable aspect is its creation during a 
period when artistic liberties in China had been considerably scaled back, and “unofficial 
art” critical of the state banned altogether. At the same time, Barricade’s existence is 
largely predicated on its own production and exhibition within the Canadian context and 
its eventual purchase by a major national institution. It is thus categorically framed, 
viewed and received in Canada not only as a work of Chinese contemporary art, by a 
                                                 
3 Wu Hung. “A Case of Being Contemporary: Conditions, Spheres and Narratives of Contemporary 
Chinese Art,” Contemporary Art in Asia: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2011), 395.  
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Chinese contemporary artist working in Canada, but also as a product of Canadian art and 
political discourses.  
Notably, Gu was one of the very first Chinese contemporary artists to exhibit in 
Canada (with Gu Wenda at the University of Toronto, in 1986). 4 Before the protests, Gu 
had been prominent in the 1980s Chinese avant-garde modernist movement and in 1986 
had undertaken a year-long residency in Canada at the Banff Centre, an educational 
institution dedicated to initiatives in the fine arts located in Banff, Alberta.5 In February 
1989, he participated in famous China/Avant-garde and the subsequent Tiananmen 
protests. With the support of Canadian curator Alvin Balkind, he fled the country shortly 
after to return to Canada to the Banff Centre, where he produced Barricade.6 
The third context is the general political and cultural conditions in Canada with 
regard to Canada-China relations and the mandate of national cultural institutions such as 
the National Gallery of Canada that play an increasingly pressurized role in the 
recognition and reception of both Chinese Canadian artists and newly emigrated artists 
from China such as Gu. The work's historical conditions – including those surrounding 
his exhibition in and migration to Canada – inscribe Barricade with observable meaning, 
value and substance. Based on interviews and primary research at the National Gallery of 
Canada, I will argue the valuation and purchase of Gu's Barricade by the Gallery was 
motivated in part by its expository character regarding historical narratives, particularly 
the ascendance of Chinese contemporary art and China as an economic world power, 
both of which are undeniably bound to processes of globalization. The conditions and 
                                                 
4 Fei Dawei, "The Problems of Chinese Artists Working Overseas," China's New Art, Post-1989 (Hong 
Kong: Hanart T Z Gallery, 1993), LX. 
5 Gu Xiong. The Yellow Pear (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp, 1997), 5. 
6 Ibid.  
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motivations surrounding this purchase refer repeatedly to the object's persistent cultural 
cachet, retained in the nationality of the artist and his migratory experience in an era of 
Chinese diasporic movement motivated by a changing economic and political climate.  
The usefulness of viewing Chinese cultural exports as an important part of 
Canadian domestic culture in a globalizing world is found in its prospective hybridization 
while simultaneously reinforcing difference between the two nations. This was, I suggest, 
achieved through the acquisition of an artwork by a Canadian artist of Chinese descent 
for the Gallery’s permanent collection because it created both a distinction between 
notions of liberty and dissidence between Canada and China while offering a subtle 
suggestion of global cultural unity. The purchase was thus favourable for economic 
development for both countries (if on terms decidedly consistent with self-assigned Euro-
American values, such as economic expansion and individual liberty). Yet a greater 
complexity of consequences surrounding the purchase emerges upon a more in-depth 
consideration of the artwork's subject matter. While the depiction of the aftermath of state 
violence against citizens is visually present in the artwork, it is also in a reminder of the 
motivations for the artist’s move to and permanent residency Canada. Viewed within a 
narrative of exile and protest, an apparent malaise with Chinese communism is brought to 
bear. Its accession further suggests that China's historical resistance to notions of progress 
proceeding from the European enlightenment, a resistance unfavourable to the non-
Chinese nations economically, are addressed by these nations culturally through a 
paradigm of globalization, hybridization and assimilation. 7  Not only contextually but 
formally, the work’s purchase embodies the synthesis of cultures in a manner favourable 
                                                 




to the concept of a single global cultural reality, itself a useful predicate for economic 
development and expansion.  
From within these interrelated contexts, I will argue the framing of Gu’s Chinese 
contemporary artist-émigré identity through the notion of dissidence both with regard to 
the artist and subject matter (the reception of which I will call “Dissident Pop), related to 
the acquisition of Gu Xiong's Barricade of Bicycles, is able to bring forward a productive 
discussion regarding Chinese economic and cultural prowess, the state of globalization, 
and the evolving concept of Chinese and Canadian identity. 
 
Outline of Sections 
 
This thesis is made up of three sections.  Section One establishes the context and 
parameters of this study, the impact of the 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square on 
contemporary art in China, the China Avant-garde exhibition that same year, the artist's 
biography and migration story, and other occurrences upon which the purchase of 
Barricade drawing by the National Gallery of Canada – is predicated. It provides an 
introductory description and exhibition history of the Barricade, offering a preliminary 
analysis of the artwork in relationship to the contexts discussed. 
Section Two discusses in more depth the reception of contemporary Chinese art in 
Western contexts and the work’s relationship to dominant discourses, focusing on 
Political Pop tendencies and the destructive impulses of Xiamen Dada as contributing to 
a critical understanding of the resulting series of work that led to the creation and 
purchase of Barricade.  In addition to elaborating on the formal aspects of Barricade, this 
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section proposes and defines the notion of “Dissident Pop” to describe the complex 
cultural cachet imparted on Chinese Political Pop art.  
Section Three considers the specific Canadian context of the work’s, including its 
national political climate and identity politics, and provides an analysis of findings. It 
questions and examines the motivations for the National Gallery of Canada’s purchase of 
the Barricade drawing at a time when contemporary Chinese art was beginning to boom 
in the international art market. It concludes by proposing that the work’s value as 
“Dissident Pop” in conjunction with embodying signifiers of modernity and democracy, 
“westerners” and corporatism, and, ultimately, the ambition of consolidating a viscous 
Canadian cultural identity that is simultaneously domestic and transnational were key 





Chongqing to Banff: Tiananmen, China Avant-garde and Gu Xiong's Journey to 
Canada 
   
Throughout the 1990s, a single iconic image dominated foreign media with regard to 
domestic Chinese politics: that of an anonymous Chinese citizen staring down a column 
of tanks on the streets of Beijing (fig. 2).8 Photographs and video from the morning of 
June 5, 1989 showed the defiance of the pseudonymous tank man against the state 
military apparatus that had been deployed against the civilian population the day before.9 
The culmination of more than a decade of social and economic reforms steered by a 
Chinese reformist government, the seven weeks of protests toward political reform in 
Tiananmen Square resulted in a massive response by the People's Liberation Army on 
June 4, 1989, leading to the deaths of as many as 2,300 civilians.10 Piles of bicycles and 
other barricades erected throughout the city were meant to slow the ingress of military 
convoys toward the square.11  The tank man and the barricades became a fulcrum of the 
global media spectacle's fascination with the resistance; images of material sacrifice and 
opposition between the individual and the state that seemed indicative, outside China, of 
a transition in Chinese society.12   
 Focused in Tiananmen Square but occurring throughout the city, the 1989 
protests began with the death in April of Hu Yaobang, the deposed Secretary General of 
                                                 
8   Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition (Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 2. 
9   Patrick Witty, “Behind the Scenes: The Tank Man of Tiananmen,” The New York Times (June 3, 2009).  
10  Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen, 2. 
11   Ibid. 
12   Gao, “From Elite to Small Man,” 149. 
9 
 
the Chinese Communist party who had failed in a push for a specific slate of 
liberalizations in the progress of political, social and economic reforms.13 Led by students 
and supported by the Chinese intelligentsia, the protests attracted millions and 
accordingly sought a disparate array of democratic changes.14 With the suppression of the 
protests came the conclusion that, after years of progress toward liberalization in popular 
thought and previously stifled by the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the effort of the 
Chinese cultural elite toward the reformation of Chinese society had failed.15  
 These developments and sentiments found significant parallels in the burgeoning 
realm of Chinese modernist art, a realm in which Gu Xiong's practice took shape. In 
February 1989, an ambitious retrospective exhibition titled China/Avant-garde featuring 
Chinese art of the 1980s was offered official sanction and a place in China's National Art 
Museum.16 Though largely detached from the established signifiers and connotations of 
the European art tradition, the exhibition’s 297 works featured examples of Chinese 
artists working actively in every major twentieth-century European style.17 The 
exhibition, however, was closely watched by the authorities; artists accustomed to the 
freedom of operating outside of official sanction and in secrecy found that much of their 
experimentation did not translate into an officially sanctioned environment.18 This was 
particularly so for those artists, Gu included, who combined installation with in situ 
performance works, several of which were deemed by the authorities to be in violation of 
                                                 
13 Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen, 67. 
14 Ibid., 1. 
15 Jeffrey Hantover, “What You See is Not What You Get: Chinese Painting After June 4,” China's New Art 
Post-1989  (Hong Kong: Asia Art Archive, 2001), LXIV. 
16 Thomas J Berghius, “Performance Art and the Role of the Body in Behavioural Action in China, 1986-
1989,”  Performance Art in China (Hong Kong, TimeZone 8, 2006), 78. 
17 Gao, “From Elite to Small Man,” 152. 
18 Berghius, Performance Art In China, 85. 
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rules governing acceptable artistic practice.19 Works that included the washing of feet, a 
definitively private practice in Chinese culture, and the on-site cooking of traditional and 
foul-smelling “stinky tofu” were ultimately overshadowed by the artist Xiao Lu, who 
fired a pistol into an installation she and artist-boyfriend Tang Song had lent to 
China/Avant-garde; the entire exhibition was subsequently shut-down by the authorities 
three hours after opening.20 Though a series of re-openings and closures followed, 
performance work was ultimately barred from the exhibition.21 
 The fate of China/Avant-garde brought a number of consequences to bear for the 
Chinese artistic community. In the wake of the Chinese social experiments in 
liberalization and free expression, the immediate results of the 1989 protests in Beijing 
were initially the indefinite suspension of social reforms which did not resume until Deng 
Xiaoping embarked on his famous southern tour of China in 1992.22 Artistic liberties 
indulged during the 1980s were repealed in similar fashion afterwards, returning artists to 
a situation in which artistic practice was closely monitored.23  A resultant spate of what 
was locally referred to as “leave-the-country-fever” seemed to grip much of the artistic 
community following the events of 1989, a phenomenon that contributed in large part to 
the global success of contemporary art by Chinese artists.24 It is to this narrative of 
                                                 
19 John Clark, “Official Reactions to Modern Art in China Since the Beijing Massacre,” Pacific Affairs 65: 
3 (1992), 336. 
20 Berghius, Performance Art in China, 90. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Clark, “Official Reactions to Modern Art in China Since the Beijing Massacre,” 336. De facto leader of 
China following Mao's death on 9 September 1976, Deng , often described as a pragmatist, emerged 
declaring the inauguration of a new period of progress and the adoption of the “Four Modernizations” that 
would usher in new economic prosperity (agriculture, industry, defence and science and technology). These 
reforms required the assistance and public affirmation of intellectuals who would be hesitant to participate 
in cultural programs following the Cultural Revolution; what resulted was a need to permit an outpouring 
of grief and emotion for the “ten years of chaos” while not undermining party rule. Maria Galikowski, Art 
and Politics in China, 1949-1986 (Leeds: University of Leeds, 1990), 161, 198. 
23  Wu, “Major Traditions in Contemporary Chinese Art,” 15.  
24  Melissa Chiu. “The Two World's of Chinese Art,” Breakout: Chinese Art Outside China (Milan: Charta, 
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migration that Gu belongs: an outbound transition motivated perhaps less by economic 
mobility than by the opportunity to freely explore and cultivate artistic expression which 
had begun with Chinese reforms before being rescinded.   
 Born in 1953 in Chonqing, China, Gu began drawing everyday objects to pass 
time when he was sent to a farm for re-education during the Cultural Revolution.25 A 
member of a family alleged to have had connections to dissident elements in academic 
circles, 17 year-old Gu worked in rice fields for 17 hours a day for the duration of a four-
year period.26  Daily drawing became a mitigating factor in the monotony of his period of 
forced labour, in which he filled multiple sketchbooks a day to pass time.27 Gu would 
maintain these initial, pastoral approaches to art: upon first seeing his work, Balkind 
noted how Gu was preoccupied by small-scale genre scenes “clearly inspired by classical 
Chinese scroll painting,” though likely also redolent of his isolation in the countryside.28 
Among Gu's earliest non-Chinese influences was Impressionist Vincent Van Gogh, 
furthering early interest in pastoral scenes while permitting exploration of new artistic 
concepts. For several years toward the end of the Cultural Revolution, Gu worked as a 
sewing machine repairman while continuing to develop his artistic abilities.29 When 
universities reopened after the Cultural Revolution, he was recruited to attend as a 
desirable candidate in view of past scholastic achievements; he was, however, initially 
refused admission, again on the basis of political connections.30  
                                                                                                                                                 
2006), 8. 
25   Robin Laurence. “Artist Overcomes Life of Obstacles,” Vancouver Sun (September 21, 1991).  
26 “Gu Xiong: Food Service Employee,” Food Service Employee Newsletter (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia, 1991), 23. 
27 Laurence, “Artist Overcomes Life of Obstacles.”  
28 Henry Tsang, “Shock culture: A Performance by Gu Xiong and Henry Tsang,” Front (March-April 1991), 
8. 
29 Ibid. 
30 “Gu Xiong: Food Service Employee,” 23. 
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 In the 1980s, Gu began to explore experimental streams of Chinese art, 
participating in a conceptual visual discourse as a part of the performance art group 
Xiamen Dada. He was accepted eventually to study at the Sichuan Institute of Fine Arts 
in 1982 which led to his first visit to Canada. In the spring of 1985, the Banff Centre 
underwent its regular adjudication process to determine which applicants for visual arts 
studio residencies would be accepted for the coming winter cycle.31 Gu stood out from a 
handful of applications from China, all from the Sichuan Institute, for what Balkind and 
his colleagues determined was a “sure hand, clear evidence of talent and a potential not 
evident among the others. We accepted him immediately.”32 Gu was invited for a year-
long artist residency at the Banff Centre in 1986, during which Balkind, whose office was 
across the hall from Gu's studio, remarked that his practice was not progressing and that 
he continued to confine himself to small-scale genre work (fig. 3). 
Balkind's insistence that Gu begin to work on a larger scale was to significantly 
expand his practice upon his return to China.33 The large-scale mural Enclosure (1989), 
similar to his later Barricade but combining elements of performance with installation 
and surface-based work, was mounted for the China/Avant-garde exhibition. The multi-
media work consisted of a series of giant canvasses on the walls and floor of the gallery 
uniformly depicting a wire fence and was regarded by journalist Tani Hansen as an 
effective synthesis of “eastern” and “western” art historical traditions (fig. 4).34 The wire 
fence had a hole cut in it; in his performance, Gu stood in front of the fence 
                                                 
31 Alvin Balkind, “Gu Xiong, 1991: The Crusher,” Fine Art Magazine (January 1992).  
32 Tsang, “Shock culture,” 9. 
33  Ibid. 
34 The problematic application of east-west binary discourse was frequently observed throughout my 
research in the field of Chinese art; Hansen's comment typifies the early reception of Chinese modernism 
and contemporary art as being “neither”,  that is, not conforming easily to east-west categorization. Tani 
Hansen, “A Taste for Freedom: China's Avant-garde Art and Artists,” Eastern Art Report (Vol. 4 No. 1. 
1992-1993), 41.  
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demonstrating that he had penetrated the barrier, but was confronted with yet another 
unbroken fence.35 Among a series of artworks produced by, according to Hansen, artists 
“at a loss to produce anything particularly Chinese,” Gu's work seemed to encapsulate the 
literal enclosure of the exhibit itself and the “dilemma of the protestors, who have been 
permitted to have the exhibition, only to find it backfiring in their faces.”36  
 As mentioned above, China/Avant-garde was shut down by Chinese authorities 
shortly after opening. This failed attempt to formalize the modernist and experimental 
movements of the 1980s under the aegis of state authority found parallel in the 
suppression of the reformist Tiananmen protestors months later. Gu was present in 
Beijing for the protests and personally witnessed the construction of bicycle barricades.37 
His return to Banff in 1990 following the massacre situated him among the post-
Tiananmen wave of artists and intellectuals who in some cases abandoned university 
positions in favour of liberty, career advancement or other changes abroad.38 Yet this was 
a decision of some consequence: in an interview Gu reported that “when the airplane took 
off, I had a very big cry. And when I got to Banff, I just slept and slept – three days, only 
getting up when I had to.”39  
The first artwork Gu undertook after arriving in Banff was Barricade of Bicycles, 
June 4, 1989, working 14 hours a day on the drawing until it was completed.40 The piece 
developed into an ink and acrylic on wove paper contour drawing made up of four sheets, 
                                                 
35  Tani Hansen. “Open doors shut on modern art,” China Now (No. 130, Summer 1989), 17. 
36   Hansen,  “Open doors shut on modern art,” 17. 
37   Laurence, “Artist Overcomes Life of Obstacles.”  
38   Hansen, “A Taste for Freedom: China's Avant-garde Art and Artists,” 41. 
39  Frank Nowosad. “Pedals and Chains: A Chinese Artist Remembers Tiananmen Square,” Victoria Times-
Colonist (May 9, 1991). 
40 National Gallery of Canada Acquisition Proposal. 
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each measuring 250 x 150 cm.41 Like much of Gu's surface-based work, Barricade 
demonstrates an “all-over” effect influenced by American Pop and the repetition of 
material objects; formal similarities emerge in comparison with several of his works, such 
as Crushed Coca-Cola Cans (1994, fig. 5).42 While demonstrably influenced by the work 
of Andy Warhol (fig. 6), Gu's artworks advance the study of material repetition by 
presenting objects in a state of disintegration or destruction, the critical distance between 
them collapsed. Gu's interest in the presentation of surface-based work is additionally 
combined with the exploration of spatial concepts through performance and installation, a 
concern Barricade demonstrates in its positioning opposite piles of bicycles and 
projections of the lonely tank man in Tiananmen.  
 The vision of single bicycles emblematic of individual sacrifice subsumed with 
the mass of Gu's Barricade serve collectively as a monument, memorializing lives lost in 
an incident perceived widely as a collective attack on all Chinese civilians.43 The bicycle 
barricades, constructed from a mode of transportation vital to the conduct of Chinese life, 
offered a simple analogy for the submersion of the individual beneath a collective loss.44 
In the drawing, two treads intersect the barricade of bicycles crushed by the apparent 
passage of a tank over top, and allude to the event's decisive outcomes: both the massacre 
of civilians and an end to a decade marked by optimistic belief that intellectual power and 
artistic endeavour could reshape Chinese society.45 As a means of livelihood and symbol 
of individual sacrifice at Tiananmen, the crushed bicycle had become emblematic of the 
                                                 
41  Ibid. 
42 Stephen Bann, “Pop Art and Genre,” New Literary History (Vol. 24, No. 1, Winter 1993), 115.  
43 Gao, “From Elite to Small Man,” 149. 
44 Li Qiao, “Death or Rebirth? Tiananmen: The Soul of China,” Beijing Spring 1989: Confrontation and 
Conflict: The Basic  Documents (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc), 22.  
45 Nicholas D Kristoff, “Beijing Death Toll May Be At Least 300; Army Tightens Control Around City But 
Angry Resistance Goes On,” The New York Times (Monday, June 5, 1989).   
15 
 
resistance and of its human costs. Gu would make several versions of the image in the 
early 1990s, such as the oil on canvas Enclosure (1990) and several silkscreen editions of 
Barricade of Bicycles (1993; edition of 50, 18 x 36 inches), and present his project in 
many configurations with and without performance or installation under the titles 
Barricades or the Enclosure series. 
 Gu relocated to Vancouver, British Columbia following the end of his second 
Banff residency in 1990. Upon its completion, Barricade of Bicycles, June 4, 1989 was 
first exhibited as an installation at Banff’s Walter Philips Gallery in 1989. Whether in 
concert with performance, installation or image, the work was subsequently presented in 
the 1991 Tiananmen Memorial Art Exhibition, Echoes After the Storm, at the Asian 
Centre of the University of British Columbia; Gu's solo exhibition, Enclosure IV, at 
Victoria, B.C.'s Open Space Gallery in 1991; and the international touring group 
exhibition Goya to Beijing (1990-1991) organized by the Canada-China Foundation and 
the Vancouver Society.46 These exhibits established the emerging analysis of the work, 
each one negotiating differently its representation of political content. Goya to Beijing 
paired Barricade with works such as Hong Kong artist Michael C. Wong's I Remember 
(1989, fig. 7) that vividly and literally depict the human impact of violence in Tiananmen. 
In Enclosure IV, involving the largest installation of bicycles, the installation of 
Barricade participated in a more symbolic presentation of the massacre as a site of 
memory, exploring the prevalence of bicycles in the event and their enduring importance 
as a point of material access to it (fig. 8).47 The gallery was filled with an over-abundance 
of bicycles both real and depicted that converged into a single spectacle underlining the 
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bicycle's cultural significance and the evident magnitude of the sacrifice, and by 
extension the tragedy of the Tiananmen massacre. "A bicycle is to a Chinese family what 
a car is to a Canadian family," according to Gu, who obtained donations of 300 bicycles 
from the public to pile into the gallery in an improvised barricade similar to those erected 
at Tiananmen.48 “One bicycle is one person,” he wrote. “Many bicycles are together. 
There is unity. It is people’s power. Tanks can roll over the barricades of bicycles, but 
people’s inner power is not conquered.”49  
  In advance of Enclosure IV, Gu and Open Space director Sue Donaldson 
considered asking the Canadian government for the loan of a tank to park outside.50 
Significantly, this idea was partly thwarted by logistical issues and partly because, 
according to Donaldson, the Canadian government had made the decision to resume trade 
with China that had been suspended following the events in Tiananmen in 1989, making 
their request unwelcome if not untimely.51 This anecdote reveals a notable intensification 
of the Canadian state’s conceptualization of its relationship with China following the 
social repression depicted in Gu's Barricade and widely-observed in the Canadian media. 
The subsequent period between the creation of the ink and acrylic drawing Barricade in 
1990 and its sale in 1996 to the National Gallery of Canada was marked by this ongoing 
public discourse of proximity and policy and significant enough to affect the final 
configuration the Enclosure IV exhibition in Victoria, B.C. 
Following acquisition, Barricade was displayed as a stand-alone image at the 
National Gallery of Canada from June 30, 1998 to January 4, 1999 as part of a group 
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exhibition titled Fundamental Freedoms: The Artist and Human Rights.52 Curated 
internally by the Gallery's Janice Seline, the exhibition’s fifteen artworks were selected 
from works in the Gallery's permanent collection that were categorized as Canadian and 
American.53 The exhibition paid tribute to “artists at the forefront of the fight against 
human-rights abuses, while lamenting the wrongs those artists have fought.”54 On seeing 
Barricade for the first time, one critic observed that Gu had created an ambivalent image, 
“a design that seems abstract at first glance but, on closer inspection, takes on the shape 
of scores of crushed bicycles – the bicycles crushed by tanks as Chinese soldiers moved 
in to kills the protestors in the square.”55 
The barricade that Gu depicts, intersected by two parallel treads where a tank has 
passed over it, represents the weight and measure of personal sacrifice and, in the twisted 
and indistinguishable parts, the convergence of historical events with personal narratives 
in which the individual can lose definition. In the work, the crushed bicycles cannot be 
distinguished from one another thus collectively evoking the loss of human life. In a 
sense, the work's emotive character stands as Gu's lament for the necessity of his 
departure, coinciding with his memorialization of individual sacrifice. While an image 
such as Beijing artist Yue Minjun's Cynical Realist painting Execution (1995, fig. 9) may 
refer to Tiananmen but ultimately remains allegorical, Gu’s work acknowledges, in the 
depiction of damaged bicycles, the moment of conflict between civilian and state. A 
depiction of a barrier erected by people to prevent the passage of troops resonates in its 
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empathy for individual sacrifice and its political directness as well as responsiveness, 
although up to a point, to major movements in the early days of Chinese contemporary art 
such as Political Pop. The political circumstances that Gu, emigrated to Canada, was able 
to directly depict could not be represented so boldly by Chinese artists who remained at 
home. "He is a classic example of an artist straddling two cultures, both of which provide 
sustenance and pain and which find their way into his work in an amalgamation of early 
Chinese influences and western expansion and daring," according to Balkind.56 Gu 
himself repeats this sentiment, saying that his work is defined by “a western style but a 
Chinese idea.”57 At the same time, through recurrent themes of personal experience and 
family history, he embraces the experience of displacement he and his family have 
undergone. Material objects such as bicycles or domestic items frequently appear in Gu's 
practice as access points to memory, repurposed for reasons specific to personal or 
historical narratives. For him, “our experiences in Canada are always linked to our past in 
China. We continually weave the old and the new together in our bodies and souls, 
destroyed and reborn in the clash of two cultures.”58  
The success of Gu’s works such as Barricade of Bicycles, June 4, 1989, can be 
seen as symptomatic of the welcome reception abroad of the notion that China, like its 
artists, operates on capitalist/consumerist economic and cultural terms. Insofar as it may 
be categorized as a contemporary Chinese artwork, Barricade brings forward 
considerations of the market interest contemporary Chinese art but, if one considers its 
institutional embrace as a work by a Chinese-Canadian artist also the seeming “embrace 
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of the periphery by the centre.”59 Gu's artistic development and the impact of Tiananmen, 
China Avant-garde and the experience of displacement, together comprise a foundational 
aetiology for the creation of Barricade and his practice since living in Canada. The 
artwork's exhibition history develops frames of interpretation that consider its signifiers 
as tied to perceptions of historical events, cultural identifications and artistic 
developments. 
                                                 




Dissident Pop: Discourses of Contemporary Chinese Art  
 
When exhibited as an installation, Gu Xiong's Barricade of Bicycles project locates the 
drawing within discourses of conceptual process-based art and performance.60 These 
conditions of creation and display align the artwork with the modernist aesthetic streams 
in Chinese art circa 1970s and 1980s defined by contemporaneity, transnationality and 
political content. This section provides a brief overview of the reception of contemporary 
Chinese art outside China, demonstrating the complexities of foreign categorization as it 
applies to Barricade, with a focus on distinctions between Chinese Political and 
American-style Pop art subject matter, its foreign valuation, and the persistent theme of 
destructiveness in Xiamen Dada. In mapping the development of Political Pop to which 
Barricade in some senses belongs, the second half of this section situates the artwork 
within a comprehensive account of Gu's aesthetic practice in relation to what I call 
“Dissident Pop.” 
 The experience of displacement provides a subtext to the analysis of Gu's 
practice and Barricade, a work whose creation in a Canadian context reduces 
significantly the possibility of political ramifications befalling the artist. For a Chinese 
artist in the 1980s the most desirable career move was to leave China, and by the early 
1990s numerous artists had relocated to France, Australia, the United States and to a 
lesser extent Canada.61 These artists settled abroad ostensibly felt “free” to explore 
aesthetic issues as they chose, reflecting often on the emotive dimensions of displacement 
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and combining sentiments of longing, resentment, injury and confusion in response to 
rapid political upheaval.62 This line of questioning is largely interpreted in foreign 
contexts as a kind of political engagement and at the heart of Chinese contemporary art 
practice.63  Literal political interpretations, rather than formal content, are often linked to 
signifiers of “Chineseness” (such as aspects of Chinese nationalism, political criticism or 
dissidence) as characteristic of Chinese artistic expression.64 However these signifiers are 
in fact an amalgamation of cultural elements gleaned both from artists' experiences in 
China and abroad.65 In her formulation of the concept of transexperience, Asian art 
historian and curator Melissa Chiu stresses “the transformation of Chineseness in 
different cultural contexts” and the necessity of an identity perception governed by the 
realities of migration or travel between mainland China and the rest of the world.66 In art 
by contemporary Chinese artists, the results of transexperience are most evident in a 
strategic interplay between past and present and the emergence of more globalized 
identities through the recovery of national iconography and its juxtaposition to 
globalization. This interest in globalization among artists, however, is often off-set by an 
interest among non-Chinese audiences primarily in signifiers of “Chinese nationalism.”67 
When, Tan Chang writes, “in the age of globalization and migration, one's identity has 
become an issue of itinerary instead of fixated, essentialist topography,” the reception of 
Chinese contemporary art outside China is still frequently fraught by the perception of a 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 37.  
63 Zhu Qi, “Do Westerners Really Understand Chinese Avant-garde Art?” Chinese Art at the End of the 
Millennium, ed. John Clark (Hong Kong, New Media Art Ltd., 2000), 57. 
64 Chiu, Breakout, 36. 
65 Ibid., 35 
66  Ibid., 38.  
67 Ibid., 43.  
22 
 
singularity of “Chineseness” under antiquated geographical and experiential parameters.68 
The cachet of contemporary Chinese art and artists on the international market remains 
that they retain a distinctive “Chineseness” in spite of a core issue in Chinese 
contemporary art being the negotiation of globalized identities, or the fact that many 
exhibitions of Chinese art can only be held abroad for political reasons.69 Artworks in 
market circulation, such as Gu’s Barricade, exchange hands at the moment of converging 
valuations such as these, their possible interpretations achieving optimum flexibility in 
their ambivalent depiction of transexperiences.  
 The location, distribution, exhibition, and sale of Chinese contemporary 
artworks outside of China is undeniably still governed by East/West discourses as the 
international art market continues to frame works abroad along a binary axis of 
totalitarian-homeland-China and liberal-settlement-west.70 Among the most basic 
presumptions symptomatic of the conceptualization of Chinese artists is that if they are 
not propagandists working under strict censorship (compared to artists living in the 
“West” who have the freedom of expression), then they must unequivocally be 
dissidents.71 This discourse however has shifted somewhat in recent years. Rather than 
viewing contemporary Chinese artists as “catalysts of shifting geo-political perceptions,” 
a prevailing tendency of the past two decades is to view them as proponents of 
commercial “sham avant-gardism,” or as dissidents.72 Cultural critic Rey Chow has 
observed that among detractors of post-liberalization Chinese cultural exports, there is a 
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further tendency toward the criticism of work that appears to commodify the experience 
of victimization.73 Despite this, the appreciation and awareness of Chinese contemporary 
art remains largely predicated on Paul Kagawa's maxim that all “third-world-artists” are 
defined and viewed as “voice[s] of the oppressed.”74  
 It is therefore necessary as a starting point in the examination of foreign interest 
in Chinese contemporary art to view it as a process of “othering” in which distinctions, 
both positive and negative, are drawn between involved parties due to constructions of 
race, nationality and other social categorizations. The growth of an international market 
in contemporary Chinese art is rich in socio-political textures although it is evident that 
the circulation of artworks is never distant from processes of comprehension through self-
other differentiation. Foreign interest in Chinese art in the 1990s occurred at a time when 
the former Western Bloc nations beheld the decline of monolithic communist systems 
around the world. The prevailing belief was that this signalled a further step toward the 
emergence of a global civil society, a function of “structural integration of entire regions 
into a single modern world system.”75 As discussed above, the popularity of art from 
China was facilitated by the movement of Chinese artists into foreign contexts, many of 
whom continued to work in response to contemporary Chinese art developments and 
recent history.76 It seems, furthermore, that political themes were the mainstay of these 
artists abroad, while artists who remained in China remained occupied with local issues 
and narratives rather than with broad social questions.77 The successful creation of an 
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international market for works of Political Pop and other similar streams served, to some 
degree, to confirm the condition of Chinese society as totalitarian and its experimental 
artist dissidents; the expanding criticism of these artists, their works and continuing 
production, and of the market in general seems to stem from a suspicion of 
entrepreneurialism.78 The question of reception is governed by a number of paradoxes. 
Criticism of the use of commercially viable political imagery as a form of opportunistic 
“self-orientalization” is itself, for example, predicated on the belief that the depiction of 
victimization, violence or memory of life in a totalitarian state is in fact the truest 
representation of that reality.79 According to Aiwha Ong, New York critics complain that 
many Chinese contemporary artworks follow a formulaic approach to marketability, 
characterized by a Warholian repetitive style and the insertion of Mao into novel 
contexts.80 This perspective of the critics thus neglects the manner in which valuation is 
given to these works to the exclusion of others through a conscious process of selection. 
In fact, this supposed “Chinesesness” in Chinese art communicated through political 
commercialism has been an irreducible part of its cultural appeal to collectors who 
otherwise have found little interest in experimental art.81 Intellectuals and curators 
accustomed to thinking about “East and West” in absolute terms fail to recognize that the 
political dimensions or narratives in artworks are not necessarily outwardly indicative of 
“Chineseness” but must be read in and from the artworks themselves.82  
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 The emergence of Chinese contemporary art in general or Political Pop 
especially garnered a complex response in both the manner and arguments for its embrace 
or rejection. Whether rejected for opportunistic commercial avant-gardism or heralded as 
an expression of an emerging global civil society, the reception of Chinese contemporary 
art is governed by a conceptual “East and West” binary in which “Westernization” 
represents progress. 83 The Chinese turn toward policy liberalization and the adoption of a 
hybrid-capitalist system represents, on one hand, a significant shift in global affairs and 
the apparent prevalence of capitalism and Euro-American cultural tendencies, a change 
seconded in the eagerness of diplomatic missions (Deng Xiaoping to the United States in 
1979; US President Ronald Reagan to China in 1984).84 On the other hand, it is seen to 
represent the irony of Communist China providing vital support to foreign capitalist 
economies during times of hardship.85 The subsequent paranoia and fascination that arise 
from the Chinese ascension is manifested in the emergence of contemporary Chinese art. 
A critical turn toward the examination of contemporary Chinese art by museums, 
galleries, auction houses, collectors, scholars and critics signalled the generalized 
awareness of China as an emergent partner as well as competitor. As Ong writes, criticism 
of Chinese art's formal aspects in 1990s was “haunted by the apparent passing of avant-
gardism to Asian artists and the worry that the explosive growth of Asian art markets 
threatens contemporary western art.”86 The fear that American critics might cease to 
occupy the position of “preeminent arbiters in the world of modern art” is echoed in the 
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dual eagerness to trade with China and fear of its economic prowess.87 The relationship 
between contemporary Chinese art and the international art market is one of unconscious, 
collective consideration of the role of China in a globalized world. 
China’s “local” to “global” transition, fundamental to the proliferation of Chinese 
artworks globally, is in large part that which furnishes recent Chinese art history with its 
contemporaneity.88 While hotly contested, contemporaneity is generally defined by 
artworks that “respond to the visual lexicons that have prevailed in the 'global art world',” 
an attribute which gives Chinese art post-1989 its reinforced status outside China.89  
Contemporary Chinese art is shaped in the absence of a systematic explanation and 
definition of what is contemporary art or contemporary art from China more specifically. 
It can initially be understood as “art that self-consciously defines itself as 
'contemporary'... and that is also accepted as such by curators and art critics worldwide,” 
but is also deeply responsive to historical developments and political shifts.90 
Contemporary Chinese art is distinguished from the modernist experiments of the 1980s 
primarily by this narrative of transmigration and its stimulation of foreign interest, both in 
the circulation of artists and of artworks. It is a phenomenon that, while made up of 
mainland Chinese artists but crucially is not geographically limited to the Chinese 
mainland, is shaped by the “Chinese” qualifier and thereby distinguished from 
contemporary art in general, even though it is commonly accepted that all contemporary 
art is comprised of increasingly homogenous international visual lexicon.91  
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The development of Chinese contemporary art up to the point of the acquisition of 
Gu’s Barricade drawing by the National Gallery of Canada has a relatively accelerated 
history. Under Deng Xiaoping, the concurrent paradigm shift in Chinese society and the 
rapid economic mobilization that occurred after 1979 were paralleled and responded to in 
artistic practice. After the death of Mao in 1976, the redirection of the society and the 
changes that it underwent constituted an enormous project of redefinition, the dismantling 
of a former regime and its replacement with another. The modernization of the artistic 
idiom was no different, and the intentions, while diverse, seem to have generally engaged  
in a process of both reflection and progress. 92 Artists began to encounter and experiment 
with an entire spectrum of suddenly available artistic information from abroad, creating 
works in everything from academic realist to impressionist styles.93 An influx of foreign 
art exhibitions "represented a crucial stage in the awakening of Chinese artists' awareness 
of aesthetic ideas never previously part of Chinese cultural discourse."94 The 
development of new, unofficial art groups began in 1978 when artists convened to 
investigate similar styles or aspirations, some of which lasted as long as a single 
exhibition and while emblematic of progress the very existence of these groups was an 
ongoing test for the authorities.95 
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 The so-called '85 movement active in the mid-1980s, the peak of the 
experimental phase, consisted of the spontaneous formation of approximately a hundred 
different art groups who “sought to create a new form of elite culture in order to improve 
traditional culture and to enlighten the masses.”96 The transition of power from a strong 
state ideology with an intellectual elite to a concentration of agency in the growing 
middle class created a distinct attitude toward to the role and value of the individual in 
society.97 The rationalization and purification of Chinese culture required for it to 
modernize were in need a corresponding humanism and a belief in the value of individual 
freedom. This was an invaluable concept during the economic and cultural reforms of the 
1980s, a period in which humanism and individualism could successfully constitute a 
consumer or an independently minded, modernized artist. Among the major tendencies of 
the '85 movement was the belief that acts of modernization invoked for artists their own 
stewardship of their country's future.98 In general terms, the aspiration of the widely 
fragmented '85 movement was the modernization of Chinese culture now on Chinese and 
not Western visual idioms. This took the form of works in varying levels of figurative 
cohesion and abstraction, works engaging with Chinese traditional media, works 
involving the deployment of Chinese characters in revised environments or the imagining 
of false characters.99 
By contrast, Political Pop, a movement which began in the late 1980s, was 
characterized by an ambivalent attitude towards the depiction of political realities in the 
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deployment of the visual language of American advertising culture.100 The movement 
made visual reference to the sensibilities that developed in American and British Pop art 
in the 1950s, a tendency adopted by many Chinese artists in the late 1980s in efforts to 
attract the attention of an international market.101 Several major Chinese artists had been 
turning toward Pop strategies of self-promotion and marketing since 1988, even before 
Tiananmen, believing that the optimism guiding the avant-garde in a search for social 
change had failed them.102 Political Pop was “inspired by western contemporary art but 
stylistically derivative of propaganda art and a result of long-term engagement between 
western academic realism and socially conscious art,” representing the re-appropriation 
of the language of mass culture in view of the Chinese national transition toward a 
consumer society.103 Typical elements of American consumer products and advertising 
aesthetics were combined with images of Chinese Communism, political propaganda and 
the Cultural Revolution in what curator and art historian Gao Mingu has described as a 
“double-kitsch” of contrasted visual clichés.104 The confluence of these cross-cultural 
sources in Political Pop “simultaneously celebrates and critiques the similarities between 
the ideological power of advertising and the ideological power of Cultural Revolution 
propaganda.”105 The movement's inception began following the liberalizations in cultural 
policy and the introduction of American Pop art, possibly stimulated by Andy Warhol's 
visit to the People’s Republic of China in 1982 and a China-touring Robert Rauschenberg 
retrospective in 1985. A towering image in Chinese Political Pop is undoubtedly Warhol's 
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1972 Mao silkscreen series (fig. 10), in which the artist appropriated and repurposed the 
Chairman's official portraits. The proliferation of works in an exploratory Pop style 
following the encounter with American Pop nevertheless failed to reflect on its 
foundational context, with neither artists nor critics fully understanding its meaning.106 
The application of Pop techniques was explicitly fame-driven by the time of its full 
inception in 1988, a tactic which had a significant impact on Chinese international art 
stars and the global market for their commodities in the post-Tiananmen period.107 The 
stated significance of the turn toward consumer-friendly Pop was its implicit contention 
that the experimental and modernist efforts of Chinese artists in the 1980s had failed to 
significantly reorient the society in which they worked.108  
Important in the dissemination of Chinese art abroad, Chinese Political Pop 
represented a “turn” toward contemporaneity and market-awareness among Chinese 
artists and, unlike many of the other modernist experiments that characterized Chinese art 
in the 1980s, had the marketing advantage of being recognizably “Chinese” in foreign 
contexts through the rapid establishment of a familiar brand.109 This turn toward 
contemporaneity marked the end of a kind of historical thinking about Chinese art in a 
continuous sweep, a moment in which the trajectory of Chinese art history experienced an 
uncommon rupture.110  The relationship between this and the outward-looking artistic 
body, jaded by their attempts to reform society and happy to relocate and sell art abroad, 
is profound. The artist Wang Guangyi, in response, famously called for a “liquidation of 
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[the] humanism” that had defined Chinese artistic practice from 1985, inaugurating his 
reflexive Pop aesthetics with Mao No. 1 (1988, fig. 11) whimsically featuring the late 
Chairman in greyscale and wearing a melancholic expression.111   
The overlapping of everyday material objects in Gu’s Barricade of Bicycles, 
suggesting their place in a broader narrative of production, distribution, use, and 
eventually destruction, emerged and exists within the Political Pop framework, deploying 
material objects in repetition in a politically resonant yet still highly ambivalent image. 
Existing in multiplicity, each individual unit is beholden to a conceptual whole, subject to 
revision of understanding and purpose.112 The exploration of objects in state of 
destruction, decomposition and submersion into a mass suggests a developed analysis of 
the state of objects, the society in which they exist, and the state of both.113 These are 
among the hallmarks of the notable aesthetic stream of Chinese Political Pop to which 
Barricade belongs both stylistically and chronologically. 
 The fundamental ambiguity of Barricade of Bicycles reflects its place in a 
trajectory of Chinese art history rather than Western postmodern discourses in which 
dissimilar cultural elements are combined in pastiche for their own sake; the drawing’s 
rendering of violence is both literal and abstract through the depiction of the aftermath 
(immediate absence) of violence.114  Barricade's Political Pop lineage proffers it a 
common recognizability in non-Chinese and Chinese cultural contexts as evidence of the 
historical convergence of consumerism and Chinese Communism. Endowed with a 
                                                 
111 Chang, “Introduction: Into the Nineties,” 3. 
112  Jennifer Dyer, “The Metaphysics of the Mundane: Understanding Andy Warhol's Serial Imagery,” 
Artibus et Historiae 25:49 (2004), 35. 
113 Ibid. 
114   Gao Minglu, “Introduction,” Total Modernity and the Avant-garde in Twentieth Century Chinese Art 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 10.  
32 
 
recognizability driven by the popularity of such artworks among foreign collectors, such 
works appeared to evoke the ethos of their time: the end of the Cold War and its 
indication of the “victory” of global capitalism and the advancement a global civil society 
on terms dictated by the predominant values of North Atlantic nations.115 Political Pop's 
brand value was therefore significant at the moment of the Cold War's dissolution in the 
blending of capitalist and communist kitsch aesthetics.116 The movement of Chinese 
artists into foreign contexts as a stimulant in this popularity adds a crucial element of 
complexity and paradox.117  
 The parameters of Political Pop are challenged by their reliance on appropriated 
subject matter, making the meaning of artworks like Barricade contingent upon the 
context in which they are viewed. Whereas American Pop had largely been an expression 
of or response to commercial culture, Chinese Political Pop espoused an ambivalent 
approach to cultural critique in a climate that viewed all ideas representative of Western 
culture as oppositional to dominant Chinese political and cultural norms in and of 
themselves.118 This wide use of Pop techniques, therefore, and their presence in 
Barricade and elsewhere in Gu's work, contains signifiers that vary depending on the 
viewer and context. Works of Political Pop produced by artists in China that, often out of 
political necessity in addition to international marketability, reduced critical discourse to 
obscured references to totalitarian repression were largely collaborative efforts of artists 
and viewer; viewed through the lens of the 1989 events in Tiananmen, the allusions to 
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dissidence were possible but the efficacy of this criticism in the context of social justice 
remained questionable.119  
It is from within this discursive context that I propose the term “Dissident Pop” to 
refer to specific instances in the foreign reception of works by Chinese contemporary 
artists, specifically those who developed styles consistent with American Pop art 
aesthetics featuring ambiguously political subject matter.120 The early prevalence of 
Chinese Political Pop created a false perception of politically dissident subject matter 
when viewed by a non-Chinese audience; a trend that accelerated following the 1989 
Tiananmen Square protests and global migration of Chinese artists.121 Predicated on the 
apparent illustration of a violent history, the perceived presence of dissident contents in 
Chinese art outside China, where much of this art was made, belongs as much to 
interpretation (and the location of that interpretation) as to the literal rendering of political 
subject matter.122  
The visual presence of memory and experience are discernible in addition to 
Barricade's political aspects, disqualifying the contention that the work is political alone 
in exclusion to other values, sentiments or allusions. The artwork therefore stands as 
evidence of the external valuation of cultural objects in the 1990s, such as through the 
categorical discursive processes of “Dissident Pop,” and their efficacy in the 
consolidation of concepts favourable to abiding political prerogatives. Barricade evinces 
many characteristics of Chinese art of the late 1980s early 1990s – particularly those 
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employed by artists in the prominent artistic trend called Chinese Political Pop. Yet unlike 
the works that typify the Political Pop movement, Gu's drawing rejects a playful 
examination of a violent history in its lingering images and makes a direct if ambiguous 
reference to a violent event and the sacrifice of individuals within it. It is additionally 
distinct for its formal ties to, exploration of and departure from canonical American Pop 
art. “Dissident Pop” thus descries the external valuation of a foreign audience, who assess 
the work of diasporic artists working in politically safe environments as contesting the 
monolith of Chinese Communist power, a mythology rooted less in comprehension than 
in projected political desires.   
Although fully developed and exhibited in Canada while at the same time 
emerging from Chinese Political Pop tendencies, Gu’s Barricade could be seen as not 
explicitly containing subversive, “dissident” elements, while nevertheless serving as a 
conduit between knowledge of events like Tiananmen and the conclusion that events like 
it are unjust.123  To close this section, I argue the ambivalence exuded in Gu’s Barricade 
is not only a critical engagement with Chinese Political Pop and an artistic response to the 
Tiananmen Square tragedy but also a reflection of the artist’s evolving practice through 
involvement with the destructive impulses of Xiamen Dada. 
 Conceptual and performance art emerged as an important part of the '85 
movement, their proponents demanding total divorce from the trajectories of the Cultural 
Revolution and the movements that followed it.124 Artists objected to utopian ideals and 
embraced anti-subjectivity and anti-authority and frequently sourced Dadaist works in 
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their own production.125 Gu's induction into experimental art practice came with his 
association with the Xiamen Dada group of performance and installation artists, engaging 
him in a variety of projects designed to undermine the authority of the artistic object. 
These processes were largely explored by Xiamen Dada and other artists and groups 
through the destruction of objects both aesthetic and mundane.126 In questioning the 
physical integrity of the aesthetic product, destruction became the principal strategy for 
critical deconstruction; the ongoing rupture and reform that became conditions of the 
Chinese search for modernity found their parallel in the breaking down of physical 
forms.127 In November 1986 at the Xiamen Art Gallery, this tendency was advanced by 
Xiamen Dada when the group made a series of ephemeral works out of garbage and 
found objects found in the gallery's vicinity, dismantling and reassembling in the vicinity 
of sixty exhibited works into increasingly arbitrary compositions.128 The performance 
exhibition, sometimes referred to as the Burning Event, ended with the incineration of its 
entire contents.129 The organizers announced that because the artists “had no way of 
knowing where these works would be exhibited, burning them has become an end in 
itself... Without destroying art there can be no peace in life.”130 In his 1986 article, 
“Xiamen Dada: A Kind of Post-Modernism?” artist Huang Yongping responded to the 
event by advocating for the expulsion of all formal, subjective doctrine in artistic 
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production, including rationalist painting.131 He saw destruction as a viable, new direction 
for Chinese art, a contention achieving full articulation in his 1987 artwork A History of 
Chinese Painting and A Concise History of Modern Painting Washed in a Washing 
Machine for Two Minutes (fig. 12). This work, in which the written histories of Chinese 
and western art literally converge, signifies the critical departure from the past that the 
Chinese materialization of artistic modernism represented.  
 The function of destructive gestures in Chinese art of the 1980s appears to 
favour the disruption of normal comprehension of static objects and human actions.132 
Xiao Lu's pistol shot that ended the China/Avant-garde exhibition in 1989 was apparently 
fired on the grounds that her work needed “a more destructive effect”; but the sentiment 
could just as easily be shifted to the exhibition generally, and the perhaps reasonable 
contention that the only way for it to secure legacy, notoriety or enduring relevance was 
for it to destroy itself through the provocation of state censors.133 The stream of aesthetic 
destruction, one which evidently dominated aspects of late-1980s Chinese art, recurs in 
Gu's practice and affirms his affinity to it. Referring to a series of early 1990s sketches 
based on crushed cans, Gu said that “common objects look dead, and only come to life 
when they are 'Killed.'”134 Gu's work diverges from American Pop lineage in its 
exploration of convergence between Warhol's neutral and flat depiction of the mundane 
and that of American Pop sculptor John Chamberlain and his crushed automobile 
bumpers (fig. 13). According to Balkind, Gu's crushed objects “are varied, and take on 
the same diverse character that we see in people, even, in fact, the personality in the 
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crusher. Thus they become individual portraits, each different from the other.”135 The 
ready analogy of the crushed bicycle as a model of individual suppression in Barricade 
found application in other instances of contemporary Chinese art. In a 1992 performance 
called Street Action: Crush Bicycles by Song Shuanson and Wang Yazhing, ten bicycles 
were loaded onto a truck in Taiyuan, Shanxi, discarded in the fast lane of the street, 
crushed with a steamroller, burned, painted and buried.136 The destroyed object signifies a 
moment of renewal, individuation and liberation of the destroyer and the departure from 
the dominant cultural stream.  
 In works such as Crushed Can (Molson Dry) (1991, fig. 14), Gu furthers the 
discourse of historical rupture in the guise of destruction, neither celebrating nor 
lamenting the advent of modernity in China. The exhibition of works like Barricade 
similarly prompted questions of the “end” of artistic objects, incorporating them as 
distinct but harmonious elements of installations. It is significant, in light of this, that Gu 
did not consider his work to be oriented toward commercial Pop (as marketable art 
objects) despite its appropriation of American Pop and Chinese Political Pop aesthetics. 
In a statement regarding his mentor, Gu said Balkind told him that “if you do commercial 
art you'll never stand out in this culture. So I didn't get into commercial art.”137  
 This statement stands in contrast to Barricade's distinct commercial viability and 
recognition as a self-contained work of art despite its obvious political subject matter and 
the ephemerality of its varying presentation as also installation and performance. As 
discussed, critical discourse was uncommon and “dissidence” not necessarily welcomed 
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of artists in China in the 1980s.138 What gives contemporary Chinese art its 
“contemporaneity” is the outward engagement of Chinese subject matter with the world 
and the assimilation of historical discourses both familiar and foreign, many of which are 
readable in this work.139 The political dimensions of transexperience, defining pillars that 
shape the reception of contemporary Chinese art, are vital to Gu's practice and his 
artworks that question the flow of Chinese artists between polarities of liberty. With 
Barricade and other works, Gu participates in a discourse of destruction both in his 
works’ visual representation and through the erosion of the singularity of the object, 
locating it within a process in which it is but one part. What objecthood Barricade loses 
in its presentation as an installation or performance is regained when the individual 
drawing, installation, performance or a combination of these components is subsequently 
purchased in a commercial market. Yet this supposed “dissidence” can be little more than 
a facsimile of free speech in which imported models of social comment are fraught by 
their lack of established, attendant signifiers. Whether artistic dissent like Political Pop 
would achieve the same intended efficacy when conducted in a foreign context is difficult 
to assess, particularly when its proponents generally do not live in this context at all or 
rarely.140 Participating in this conversation, Gu complicates the dimensions of Barricade 
which is otherwise a straightforward depiction of the effects of a massacre. The work 
centres around the failure of intellectual culture to create social change in China, a failure 
manifested in the closing of the China/Avant-garde exhibition and the Tiananmen Square 
massacre. Yet its readability as a literal rendering of historical violence alone (more easily 
legible than formal discourses of objecthood or the exploration of personal memory or 
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conviction) complicate the motives of the National Gallery of Canada in their purchase of 
the drawing. As discussed in the next section, the purchase of the work reflects the 








Framing at Arm's Length: Identity Politics, Foreign Policy and the National Gallery 
of Canada Purchase 
 
The global circulation of artworks by Chinese contemporary artists in the 1990s ran 
concurrent to a dramatic transition in international politics, resulting in a shift in their 
artworks' the monetary and cultural value.141 In the Canadian context, the emergence of 
contemporary Chinese art was situated in a political climate that was attentive not only to 
China and its rising position on the world stage as opportunities for expanding trade and 
economic growth but also the still resonant memory of the tragedy of Tiananmen. This 
section discusses the circumstances and motivations surrounding the purchase of Gu’s 
Barricade of Bicycles ink and acrylic on paper drawing by the Gallery in 1996, detailing 
the prevailing political climate within Canada and the pressures of identitarian politics 
informing the institution’s decisions regarding acquisitions. I argue that the purchase of 
Barricade required a paradoxical categorization, exemplifying contemporary Chinese art 
while reflecting contemporary art production within Canada. Gu's “Canadianess” was 
underlined in the designation of Barricade as an artwork appropriate to acquire for the 
Canadian collection at the Gallery, while the work’s subject matter thematically typified 
the powerful resonance of similar examples of contemporary Chinese art that 
encapsulated Chinese voices aimed at dissidence and protest. Given this paradoxical 
categorization, I argue the Gallery purchase reflected ways in which the general foreign 
reception of contemporary Chinese art in the 1990s contained the unconscious 
signification of the victory of global capitalism, and the emergence of a global civil 
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society, while simultaneously voicing apprehension of China’s ascension as a world 
power despite its poor human rights record.142  
Canada sought to renew relations with China during the 1993-2003 Liberal 
administration following a brief suspension of diplomatic ties in the period immediately 
after Tiananmen. Then Prime Minister Jean Chrétien signed multiple bilateral agreements 
and personally led four “Team Canada” diplomatic visits to the country during his ten-
year tenure.143 The Chretien government's approach to China was frequently subject to 
criticism for its apparently exclusive concern with the development of economic ties and 
limited interest in discussing the Chinese record on human rights.144 The ongoing trade 
missions (which sometimes include educators and cultural figures), according to the 
Canadian Trade Commission: 
… generally follow a structured program in which one or more countries are 
visited, mission members spending an average of 1.5 to 2 days in each city within 
a one week period. The program includes business briefings, plenary/sector 
sessions, site visits (when possible), and effective networking events. Participants 
are introduced to potential partners in the host country and have pre-arranged 
business-to-business meetings tailored to their individual needs.145  
Whereas the Canadian government under Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney (1984-1993) had suspended trade with China following the events in 
Tiananmen in 1989, the diplomatic platform upon Chrétien’s 1993 election as Prime 
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Minister exclusively supported the advancement of human rights as economically 
beneficial, an incentive toward improved foreign exchange.146 The 1994 Team Canada 
mission led by the newly elected Liberal government established bilateral China-Canada 
contracts in the amount of $8.5 billion, representing both the most prosperous trade 
mission in Canadian history and a significant reversal in policy.147 The consistent 
diplomatic and trade initiatives led by the Chretien Liberals in the 1990s prompted former 
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji to refer to Canada as China's “best friend.”148 
It was during this shift toward improved relations and trade between China and 
Canada, two nations with fundamental political differences, that the National Gallery of 
Canada sought to acquire Gu’s Barricade drawing for their permanent collection of 
Canadian art. While framed as a valuable contribution to Canadian national culture, the 
work simultaneously created an “other,” contributing implicitly to definitions of Canadian 
identity while crudely aligning itself with the images of dissidence, free-speech, and 
Chinese persons living in Canada. Gu's work, in ways established in this study as typical 
of Chinese Political Pop, achieved both its potential diplomatic and “othering” objectives 
through its evasion of firm categorization. At the time of purchase, Gu self-identified as a 
Chinese artist living in Canada as distinct from other possible ethnic categories (for 
example, Chinese-Canadian, or Canadian).149 Notably, the acquisition proposal indicates 
that Gu, his wife and daughter were all Canadian citizens at the time of accession in 
1996.150 This is significant in that the artwork was therefore, from its inception to its 
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purchase, conceptualized as a product of Chinese cultural reality but understood and 
valued as a consequence of the artist’s migration story. Yet, similar to increasingly 
popular indirect treatment of political subject matter in Chinese contemporary art, the 
very subject matter of Barricade – a direct and unequivocal reference to the violence at 
Tiananmen in 1989 – signalled that it could not have been freely created in the Chinese 
context, and very likely would not have been.  
 In view of a national policy shift towards liberal Canada-China trade and the 
increasing international attention to contemporary Chinese art, it is significant that the 
Gallery developed a concurrent interest in the acquisition of work by a Chinese artist with 
strong, thematically political aspects. During periods of economic growth, it is not 
unusual that mutual interests between nations can be expressed and bilateral relations 
established through mutual patronage and goodwill from one country's artists and culture 
to another's as a form of cultural diplomacy.151 Writing on China-Canada relations, The 
necessity of achieving and maintaining a harmonious relationship is stated by Pitman B 
Potter and Thomas Adams, who write that “political and diplomatic cooperation on issues 
of direct bilateral concern [between China and Canada] and also on issues of global 
import remains critically important. Commercial and trade ties linking Canada with the 
world's second largest and fastest growing economy are of obvious significance. Cultural 
and civil society ties, including immigration patterns and the ancillary effects they 
generate, are also important.”152 American political scientist Harvey Feigenbaum writes 
that, where “culture is an expression of national identity, and as such is to be promoted 
and protected as a public responsibility,” the ascent of national institutions is correlative 
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to the expression of matters in foreign and domestic affairs, a situation to which the 
Canadian context is not immune.153 Such instances of cultural diplomacy inevitably arise 
in the exhibition and purchase of artworks by Asian artists outside Asia, frequently 
beholden to “a conflicting process engaged at once in promoting Asian identities that are 
seen as intrinsically different while at the same time proclaiming their sameness.”154 
 In the context of the purchase of Barricade, it was just as important that Gu is 
Chinese as it was that he is a (Chinese) contemporary artist active in Canada. The 
acquisition would signal that Canada was “Chinese” place with a desire to represent the 
presence of its Chinese population – an agreeable statement that would be seen as in 
support of trade and the consolidation of a national culture with a global reach. Artist 
Germaine Koh, the curatorial assistant who worked on Barricade's accession to the 
Gallery, explained in an interview that the purchase was not directly influenced by 
governmental policy.155 Though federally funded, the Gallery operates at arms-length 
from the government, and curatorial decisions were not directly influenced by political 
climate or pressures.156 The purchase of Barricade, however, a work then unlike any 
other in the Gallery's permanent collection, occurred at a time when governmental policy 
was decidedly in favour of closer Canada-China ties. It is thus unlikely in this political 
climate that the first-time purchase of a work by a contemporary Chinese artist would be 
void of any political dimension.157  
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In an interview with the author, Diana Nemiroff, Senior Curator of Canadian Art 
at the National Gallery of Canada from 1990 to 2005, recounted how she had decided 
during a visit to Gu's studio to purchase Barricade, a work she had previously seen in 
exhibition.158 When the drawing was acquired, Nemiroff worked under the National 
Gallery's Assistant Director Brydon Smith; his approach, she said, was “quite hands-off 
and gave all the senior curators considerable leeway regarding acquisitions. His response 
would have been positive; he was open to new directions and interested in political 
subjects in art.”159 According to Nemiroff, at the time of purchase there was no particular 
awareness of contemporary Chinese art; the work was in fact purchased with budget 
allocations for contemporary Canadian artworks, specifically a separate allocation for 
works on paper. In 1996, the allocation's annual total was $50,000 and the work was 
likely purchased for between $10,000 and $20,000.160 Nemiroff reported that purchases 
over $20,000 “would have to be balanced among various priorities. In that range, we 
might not have been able to purchase everything we wanted. Below $10,000 purchases 
could be relatively free, even spontaneous.”161 According to her, purchases representing 
such a significant portion of the annual allocation would have “loomed larger in such a 
context,” and been “relatively accessible, but not inconsiderable.”162  
On the decision to purchase Barricade, Nemiroff stated that “there was no 
awareness of any political agenda to be played by federal institutions where art purchases 
were concerned. Each federal institution had its own mandate, laid out in its collections 
policy, governing directions followed and general criteria. The process was not politicized 
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and there were no foreign relations considerations... There was no discussion of possible 
reaction from the Chinese government.”163 Interested in Gu's experiences at Tiananmen 
and story of migration, her reasons for the acquisition were “divided about equally 
between what I found to be its eloquent formal resolution and its political and very 
personal subject matter.”164 
With the acquisition of Barricade, the gallery thus obtained an artwork that 
carried a myriad of signifiers which find their critical intersection at the moment the artist 
left an artistically restrictive environment for political safety and career advancement and 
arrived in Canada. The purchase functioned as an investment into a culturally-relevant 
object that would “expand the representation of artists dealing with and/or exemplifying 
the contemporary phenomenon of immigration and displacement,” in addition to the 
support for a growing contemporary art scene within Canada.165 However, although not 
stated, the additional cultural currency of this work, by a Chinese-born contemporary 
artist, was also significant given the context. Created within the democratic context of 
Canada, the work’s content criticized China as an authoritarian, communist while never 
making this criticism explicit or literal. In this way it established a crucial frame of 
synthesis between China and Canada, while enforcing their parameters of difference. 
 In the Canadian context, the effect of Canadian multiculturalism has frequently 
been the erasure of nuances of identities between persistently diverse cultural 
communities.166 According to Stuart Hall, representation in diasporic environments 
(although ostensibly not exclusive to them) is important to the substantiation of 
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identity.167 Identity, in the context of the diasporic artist's own projected identity through 
art, is most effective when it is recognizable to both the self and to what art historian John 
Clark refers to as the diaspora's “receiving community.”168 Cultural narratives that seek to 
efface diversity, in favour of a mythology of sameness and equality, tend to foster 
representations of statistical ethnic minorities as a homogeneous group; yet this is by no 
means representative of reality.169 In the context of Chinese restaurants, for example, 
generalized aesthetic tropes in decoration are employed and recognizable to both 
Chinese- and not-Chinese Canadians.170 There exists a process of detachment from 
identity with submersion in a foreign culture and how, as a strategy for maintaining 
cultural values, representation of identity may interact at the point of caricature or 
hyperbole. And yet within this simplified visual system, the knowledge of the complexity 
of one's own identity is maintained.171  Gu's critical engagement with and visual 
rendering of the 1989 events of Tiananmen Square signifies something self-conscious 
about this process of detachment, reconfiguration and analysis, all within the Canadian 
context in which Barricade was made. For example, Barricade typifies, at the same time, 
the global context of Chinese contemporary art, especially Political Pop art in 1990s, in 
ways the artist was doubtlessly aware of and whose appeal he could himself assess. 
The purchase of Barricade, amidst a transition in view of Canada's international 
discourse regarding trade and foreign affairs with China, was also concurrent to a peak in 
discourses of Canadian cultural and race politics, marked by a wide proliferation of 
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related exhibitions, knowledge production and cultural activism that had begun in the 
1970s and 80s.172 This period saw artists and other cultural producers attempt to re-
inscribe a critical discourse of race into cultural affairs and processes.173 These intra-
national, anti-racism activities were not uncommon among English-speaking North 
Atlantic nations in 1990s, where shifting perceptions in social, racial or ethnic identities 
were at play.174 In Canada, these activities emerged from within the more easily 
negotiated terrain of smaller galleries and artist-run centres. Canadian national 
institutions, in turn, began to observe how “the old civil agenda of desegregation and 
access to jobs was merging with, and in a sense being replaced by, a politics of 
representation” and reflected this through shifts in programming.175  The Banff Centre, 
for example, hosted a residency called Race and the Body Politic in 1993, a year after the 
Canadian Museum of Civilization launched the exhibition Indigena (1992) that combined 
works by contemporary First Nations artists with historical and traditional objects.176 
With Land, Spirit, Power (1992), the National Gallery of Canada stated a commitment to 
represent First Nations contemporary artists, beginning the recognition of racialized 
identities as distinct and valued categories within the institution.177  
 The Canadian “struggle with its self-definition as a culturally-diverse nation” 
was reflected in the tone of these exhibitions in the 1990s, as it was in scholarship 
concurrent to the purchase of Barricade which investigated, for example, the category of 
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“Asian Canadian” as a political project.178  Within these discourses, there arose persistent 
efforts to increase the institutional representation of artists of colour and Indigenous 
artists. The purchase of Gu’s Barricade advances these efforts, although not 
unproblematically, through the simplification of  Gu identity to “Canadian” via his 
residential status in Canada and in reinforcing a major art institution’s reputation of 
cultural inclusivity. In their analysis of the use of identity politics by institutions, Avigail 
Eisenberg and Will Kymlicka observe that dominant groups are not passive in the framing 
of minority cultures or traditions, but apply frames to these traditions “in such a way as to 
preserve their own power and authority against potential challenges.”179 The personal 
rewards that artists, for instance, accrue with individual recognition by national 
institutions are inviting but ultimately conceal “ongoing processes of assimilation or 
exclusion of vulnerable groups.”180 In Canadian museums, the institutional professionals 
involved in the circulation of artworks by non-white artists are generally white, a 
Eurocentric norm deemed necessary to “authorize” and permit discussion of objects as art 
rather than ethnographic subjects.181 With implications of engagement “at an ideological 
level with definitions of what constitutes and is valued as culture, and more specifically, 
national culture,” this inequity is compounded by racial assumptions and expectations 
from artists of minority groups (i.e. not of Canada’s “founding” nations, British or 
French) to produce artworks that explore solely issues of cultural identity.182 While 
Nemiroff referred to the official “arm's length” relationship between the federal 
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government and the National Gallery of Canada, there is nevertheless “a manner in which 
[the institution] still represents state-sanctioned culture,” processing and framing objects, 
identities or events in accordance with prevailing Eurocentric ideologies.183 
These developments in discourses of identity in relation to Canadian institutions 
are related to significant demographic changes within Canada in response to global 
politics. From the mid-1980s to approximately the year 2000, Canada saw an influx of 
migration from Hong Kong in anticipation of the return of the former British colony to 
the People's Republic of China on July 1, 1997.184 A crisis concerning the shape of 
mainland administration of Hong Kong motivated a mass migration abroad following the 
signing of an accord of retrocession by British and Chinese authorities in 1984.185 Canada 
took an aggressive stance on the recruitment-style admission of skilled immigrants from 
Hong Kong who fearful the handover wished to emigrate, leading to allegations from 
British scholar George Segal of “immigration without responsibility.”186 Nevertheless, 
Hong Kong migrants seeking refuge from feared economic and civil sanctions generally 
preferred Canada over other destinations, particularly Vancouver. The migration tendency 
only intensified post-Tiananmen: Canada received around 30,000 arrivals from Hong 
Kong every year between 1991 and 1996.187 The migration was to profoundly impact 
cities like Vancouver, providing a significant infusion of economic growth through the 
arrival of skilled labourers and demographic boom.188 The 1996 Canada census reported 
                                                 
183 Gagnon, 13 Conversations About Art and Cultural Race Politics,  43. 
184 Ming K Chan, “Friends Across the Pacific: Links Between Canada and Hong Kong in Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives,” The China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century (Ottawa, 
ON: University of Ottawa press, 2011), 84.  
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid.  
188 Ashley Ford, “Enter the dragon: Hong Kong and Vancouver have ties that won't be severed with the 
raising of the Chinese flag next week,” The Province (Vancouver, BC: June 26 , 1997). 
51 
 
that the greater Vancouver area had 279,040 residents self-identifying as Chinese, 
comprising 49 per cent of the city's “visible minority” population.189 The impact on 
Canada's third-largest city was so great that, when fears regarding the Chinese 
administration of Hong Kong deflated post-1997, Vancouver found itself in economic 
jeopardy in view of a mass exodus of Hong Kong residents back home.190 
Nevertheless, the Vancouver environment between 1989 and 1997 was highly 
politicized, and it is here that the frequent and early exhibition of Barricade inscribes the 
work with its Dissident Pop characteristics. We have seen in this study how the formal 
aspects of Gu's Barricade drawing made it inalienable from a trajectory of Chinese art, 
particularly of Chinese trends in Political Pop. The appreciation of the apparent value of 
the work in Canadian and global cultural context must also take into account that the 
drawing in fact belonged to a larger conceptual project that also at times featured donated 
bicycles, projections and other elements such as performance. Barricade's exhibition 
record reveals its frequent display in Vancouver-based exhibitions with political themes 
that would have resonated with an expatriate Chinese (including Hong Kong) population 
that wielded increasing economic and cultural sway.191  
 A major figure in the Vancouver scene was Zheng Shengtian, an artist and 
curator who relocated to the city post-Tiananmen at around the same time as Gu. Zheng, 
an organizer of the Echoes After the Storm Tiananmen memorial exhibition, has played a 
significant role in connecting Chinese contemporary artists with the international 
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community both through exhibitions, promotion and authorship both in China and 
abroad.192 Serving as conduit between the Hong Kong contemporary art gallery Art 
Beatus and its Vancouver branch director, Zheng's role in the promotion of Chinese 
contemporary art in Canada critically impacted its frames of reception. The political 
climate in early-90s Vancouver inspired by Tiananmen and the Hong Kong handover 
made the appeal of political subject matter significant to the distribution of artists and 
their visibility as political figures. It was most likely in this environment that Gu's 
Barricade was first seen and noted by Nemiroff previous to its purchase and display. The 
politicized context of exhibitions such as Echoes After the Storm and Goya to Beijing 
framed the emergence of this work in the politicized cultural climate of Vancouver, 
bolstering its appeal at time when discourses of identity politics and critiques of 
institutional representation were in full force.  
 While Nemiroff states that there was no particular awareness of Chinese 
contemporary art at the time of Gu's Barricade drawing's purchase, the Gallery was 
nevertheless turning its mandates toward the representation of Chinese subject matter 
inspired by its political dimensions. These initiatives were led largely by Nemiroff, who 
established a reputation for the composition of progressive and challenging curatorial 
projects during her 21 years at the Gallery.193 The mid-1990s witnessed an increasing 
responsiveness from the Gallery to currents in contemporary art and the politics of 
representation and interest in contemporary art by Asian artists particularly accelerated 
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following Barricade's purchase, in which Nemiroff played a pivotal role. Prior to 1996, 
the Gallery's collection of “Asian” artworks was primarily a large endowment of 
historical sculpture from the Indian subcontinent.194 Two eighteenth-century ink paintings 
by Hua Yan, which had been gifted to the Gallery in the 1960s, were the only Chinese 
artworks in its permanent collection.195 After the acquisition of Gu’s work in 1996, the 
Gallery purchased six additional contemporary Chinese artworks: three map-books by 
Chinese artist Hong Hao (purchased in 2000) and three ceramic busts by Ah Xian 
(purchased in 2005), who is categorized as “Chinese-Australian.” Vancouver-born 
contemporary artist of Chinese heritage Ken Lum had work accessioned by the Gallery in 
1992 and 2000.196 According to Gallery's dossier on the artists, Lum's work explores 
issues of race and class relevant to tendencies in representational politics, the Vancouver 
art scene and shifts in Gallery's mandate through Nemiroff.197 
Barricade's purchase also occurred on the horizon of the international group 
exhibition Crossings, presented at the National Gallery of Canada from August 7 to 
November 1, 1998, curated by Nemiroff. The acquisition of Gu's Barricade is 
significantly connected to Crossings, which included works by Chinese contemporary 
artists, including Chinese-born, New York-based artist Xu Bing's Book of the Sky which 
was displayed in China/Avant-garde in 1989.198 Among many highly successful 
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exhibitions she has curated, Nemiroff has described this exhibition as her favourite.199 
Critic Paul Gessell wrote that “Crossings is about exiles, the experience of migrants, 
refugees and immigrants coping with a new land while still rooted in the old. Most of the 
15 artists are themselves exiles, living in Canada, the United States or Europe; many are 
from repressive or war-torn countries.”200 With this exhibition, Nemiroff astutely 
addressed persistent issues in the shape of Canadian arts and culture in response to world 
affairs: "...with immigration, with everybody moving around, it's harder and harder to 
speak about identity... I decided that I wanted to deal with the subject of displacement, to 
show in an exhibition how complicated such a concept could be."201  
Stirring controversy that was widely addressed in Canadian media, Crossings was 
largely composed of installation works with a distinctive (if ambivalent) political 
dimension.202 Barricade can be seen as playing significant early role in this turn in the 
Gallery's exhibition initiatives. Both in formal articulation and subject matter, the work 
was precedent to a range of acquisitions and exhibitions at the Gallery by Asian Canadian 
artists. In the concurrent tension of renewed relations between Canada and China, a 
massive and politically motivated relocation of Hong Kong residents to Vancouver, and 
the rise of contemporary Chinese art in aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, 
Barricade's purchase signalled an important moment of reflection on the changing shape 
of Canadian society, its relationship to its people and to the world.  
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This thesis has examined how contemporary Chinese (Canadian) artist Gu Xiong’s 1990 
drawing, Barricade of Bicycles, June 4, 1989, ended up being acquired by the National 
Gallery of Canada’s permanent collection of Canadian art, by tracing the development of 
Political Pop to the moment of Barricade's accession in 1996. My critical analysis 
suggests that Barricade – conceived and witnessed in China and executed in Canada by 
an artist straddling both countries – responds simultaneously to both Chinese and 
Canadian contexts, by bringing forward discussions on human rights, divergent economic 
systems, and the international art market, as well as cultural exchange. Gu’s Barricade, as 
a Chinese-Canadian artwork, paved the way for the transition into a globalizing 
acquisition policy and the diversification of what is conceptually valuable to the Canadian 
national art collection. Subsequent acquisitions of work by contemporary Chinese and 
other Asian artists living and working in Canada account further for the National 
Gallery's globalization of its permanent collection and a simultaneous negotiation of 
“Canadianess.”203  
In the last section, I argued that the Gallery’s acquisition of Barricade was 
motivated by the work as being an example of both contemporary Chinese art and 
Canadian art by discussing the various political and cultural contexts in the mid-nineties 
that would have informed and compelled the Gallery to go through with the purchase. As 
an example of what I propose to call Dissident Pop, as discussed in Section Two, the 
cultural cachet of Barricade benefited from the assumption that the artist was at risk in 
the work's production, and that the artist is therefore an active dissident, while at the same 
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time was also invested with associations to discourses of freedom of expression, the 
history of Chinese migration to Canada, and diplomatic relations between Canada and 
China. Approaching Barricade as Dissident Pop enabled the discussion to work against 
the view of the work as solely an indication of malaise in Chinese communism expressed 
through the growth of dissident artistic strands which in fact are responding to art market 
demands, dislocation and relocation in foreign environments.  
Gu's Barricade is ostensibly political; but it is also intensely personal. It 
corresponds to memory, and it is memory and experience, not a political agenda, which 
gave rise to this work. For the purposes of this study, its political subject matter, not 
contrived to stimulate a critical discourse on political reform, was most significant for 
how it was received and valued as cultural capital. These contents revealed the 
impossibility of extracting this work from the trajectory of Chinese art history. Its Pop art 
derivations were not directs links to a European-American art discourse so much as 
evidence of the encounter of Chinese artists with the “west” culturally. 
Ultimately, as the first purchase by the National Gallery of Canada of a work by a 
contemporary Chinese artist who immigrated to Canada and obtained Canadian 
citizenship, Gu’s Barricade and this history of its journey has been significant in bringing 
forward this discussion of the range of cultural, social and economic developments in 
both contemporary Chinese and Canadian art contexts from the 1970s to the 1990s, 
signalling the continuously changing shape of global economic ties and future becomings 






fig. 1 Gu Xiong. Barricade of Bicycles,1991. Ink on paper. National Gallery of 
Canada, Ottawa. 




fig. 2 Jeff Widener. “Tank Man,” June 5, 1989. Photograph. Associated 





fig. 3 Gu Xiong. Untitled (Chinese Village Row), ca. 1985. 17.5 x 20.5  inches. 









fig. 5 Gu Xiong. Crushed Coca-Cola Cans, 1994. Acrylic on canvas.
 [http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~dmg/html/exhibitions/0304/bing_xiong/]  
  







fig. 7 Michael C. Wong. I Remember, 1989. Lead pencil on paper, coloured pencil. 
[http://www.goyatobeijing.org/gallery/wong_03.html]  
 
fig. 8 Gu Xiong. Enclosure, 1991. Bicycles. Dimensions variable. Open Space Gallery, 
Victoria, BC. [http://www.openspace.ca/node/634]  
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fig. 9 Yue Minjun. Execution, 1995. Oil on canvas. Private collection.
 [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/5/5f/Chineseart_Executionpainting.jpg]  
 
 
fig. 10 Andy Warhol. Mao, 1973. Silkscreen print. 176 x 136 inches. Art Institute of 
Chicago. [http://www.artic.edu]  
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fig. 11  Wang Guangyi. Mao No. 1, 1988. Oil on canvas. Private collection. 
[http://www.artmarketmonitor.com]  
fig. 12 Huang Yongping. A History of Chinese Painting and A  Concise History of 







fig. 13  John Chamberlain,. Remnant Gardens, 1986. Automobile  bumpers. Pace 
















fig. 14  Gu Xiong. Crushed Can (Molson Dry), 1991. Acrylic on canvas.   
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